TREQUARTISTA
FORMATIONS, STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
Euro 2012 came to an end with Spain being crowned champions. Spain managed to retain the cup conceding one goal on their way to glory. As with any competition there is always an interest in the tactical developments. Below I have highlighted some that came to light.
1) The use of the 3-5-2 and 4-4-2 diamond/4-3-1-2 formations was one of the highlights of the tournament and how fitting it was that it came from the Italians. The Italian Seri A is infamous for what many claim to be boring matches but in truth it’s a league that produces tactically fascinating matches. The team was composed of players that play for clubs that use those formations (Pirlo, Marchisio, Chiellini, Bonucci all familiar with the 3-5-2 which was used by Juventus). Prandelli’s decision to go with formations that are somewhat seen as obsolete in other nations paid dividend more so in the matches against Spain and Germany. The use of the 3-5-2 certainly bamboozled the Spanish in opening group match against the Azzuri. It would have been fascinating to see how Spain would have approached the game had the Italians stuck with the 3-5-3 in the final. The Germans in trying to nullify the numerical superiority that the 4-4-2 diamond has over 4-2-3-1 in midfield ended up unbalancing their team which led to their demise. Spain also played majority of their matches with a 4-6-0 formation taking advantage of the fact that most of the Barcelona players are familiar with that deployment. Not many teams will be able to replicate this because they simply don’t have the type of technically gifted players that Spain has at their disposal. Therefore it would seem that having clubs playing different formations enables a manager to select players who are well trained in the various formations thus enabling him to tinker easily and adapt tactically as the situation demands.
2) As always the underdogs have to find a way to upset the superior teams. Tactics were adapted to try and nullify the perceived strengths of the opponents and though most were successful they did end up weakening their attacking strategies. The Portugal vs Spain game highlights this problem. Though Portugal did play well and managed to tame Spain but in so doing disabled their counter attacking strategy managing no shot on target and creating only one opportunity to counter attack. The same can be argued with respect to England. As in other aspects of life so is with football tactics in an effort to try curb one problem another emerges.
3) The interesting thing about formations is that it’s down to the coach’s interpretation. The 4-2-3-1 has become a popular choice for many a team. What separates teams from one another using this system are the functions and duties they attach to the two holding midfielders. Semi finalist Germany had Khedira and Schweinsteiger as the two holding midfielders but one had the license to join in the attacks. This was more evident in the game against Holland with Schweinsteiger shuttling forward enabling him to produce two assists. In contrast to the Dutch who had two totally combative midfielders who offered little attacking threat. This was reminiscent of the AFCON final were Ivory Coast fielded Zakora and Tiote as the holding midfielders who simply had no impact on Ivorian attacks. The 4-2-3-1 formation is simply a 4-4-2 with wingers pushed forward and a withdrawn striker who normally plays as a playmaker. In light of this it can be argued that one of the two holding midfielders has to offer an attacking threat either in the form of late runs into the penalty area to support the attack or have an excellent passer of the ball able to pick out penetration passes.
4) Greece, England and Ireland tried to do what Chelsea did in the champions league semi final and final but fell short. Counter attacking is a strategy best adopted when you are the underdog and relies heavily on the fact that you do not concede first. If it so happens that you concede and find yourself chasing the game you are faced with two problems. First being a mental one because you have to change from a defensive mindset to an attacking one and second being the personnel at your disposal. Once a team has been configured to play on the counter attack the selection is usually based on which players will enable the team to defend well before considering your attacking options. Therefore the transition to a more attacking strategy may leave you short in terms of the right personnel since you are restricted by the number of substitutes and also you become too open as defensive cohesion is sacrificed. Greece managed to keep Germany at bay until Lahm scored few minutes before half time. The natural reaction by the Greeks was to try get a goal which they did, in so doing opened themselves to attacks and the defense crumbled.
5) How to deal with a deep laying playmaker; Pirlo was a delight to watch, though to many his performance might have come as a surprise. A great passer of the ball with both feet he could spray passes around with unsurpassed accuracy. Not only has he been a thorn in many of the teams at euro2012 it was virtually impossible to stop him in the league enabling Juventus to win the league unbeaten. England gave him too much respect and he dictated the game culminating in a cheeky penalty. As he is a great passer of the ball it can be argued that defending deep and allowing him time on the ball is a natural way to deal with such a playmaker as you are effectively denying him opportunities to play penetrative passes. In so doing you allow him to control the game and hence are constantly inviting pressure and were it not for poor finishing by the Italians the game against England should have ended within the ninety minutes. The other option is to have the striker in a 4-4-2 or the playmaker of the 4-2-3-1 track and pressurize him. England and Germany tried that with Rooney and Kroos respectively asked to track Pirlo without success. The failure lies in the fact that strikers and playmakers simply aren’t good at defensive duties. It will be best to have a more combative midfielder pushing up to try pressure such a player.
LESSONS OF EURO 2012